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ABSTRACT: We (2013, 2014) argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in 
the following sense. Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that 
H would explain O if H and O were true. Then Pr(H | O & E) = Pr(H | O). We defended 
this screening-off thesis (SOT) by discussing an example concerning smoking and 
cancer. Climenhaga (forthcoming) argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the 
wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a 
variant of SOT, called “SOT*”, and contends that it too gives the wrong result. We here 
reply to Climenhaga’s arguments. We suggest that SOT provides a criticism of the widely 
held theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation” (IBE). 
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1 Introduction 
 
We (2013, 2014) argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following 
sense: 
 
Screening-Off Thesis (SOT): Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the 
proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then Pr(H | O & E) =  
Pr(H | O). 
 
Some comments are in order. First, the sense of evidential irrelevance used in SOT is 
Bayesian: evidential irrelevance is a matter of probabilistic irrelevance. SOT is neutral on 
whether there are alternative senses of evidential irrelevance on which explanatoriness is 
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evidentially relevant.1 Second, the probabilities at issue should be understood as rational 
credences. Third, SOT concerns explanatoriness in the sense of E; SOT allows that 
explanatoriness in some other sense might be evidentially relevant.2 
There is no explicit mention in SOT of background information, so it might seem that 
SOT is meant to hold regardless of the background information codified in Pr. But SOT 
then is false. For suppose that Pr(H | O) < 1 and that the background information codified 
in Pr includes the proposition that ~E ∨ H. Then Pr(H | O & E) = 1 > Pr(H | O). So SOT, 
if it is to be true, must be restricted. But how? Our answer is that SOT should hold in at 
least a wide range of realistic cases3 where Pr includes information about sample 
frequencies, as in the following example. 
Suppose you examine a large random sample of people older than age 50 and observe 
the following two frequencies: 
 
FreqS(people who were heavy smokers before age 50) = 0.3 
 
FreqS(people who were heavy smokers before age 50 | people who got lung cancer 
after age 50) = 0.7 
 
Here “S” means sample. You then come across Joe. He is more than 50 years old, but he 
was not in your sample. What value should you assign to Pr(Joe was a heavy smoker 
before age 50)? And what value should you assign to Pr(Joe was a heavy smoker before 
age 50 | Joe got lung cancer after age 50)? 
Suppose that you estimate these probabilities by using your sample frequency 
information and that, for some 0 < α < β < 1, your estimates are: 
 
Pr(Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50) = α 
 																																																								
1 McCain and Poston (2014) miss this point. They grant that SOT is true in certain cases, 
but contend that even in those cases explanatoriness is evidentially relevant because it 
affects what they term “weight of evidence”, which they say bears on a probability’s 
“resilience”. 
2 McCain and Poston miss this point; see Roche and Sober (2014, p. 197) for discussion. 
In Section 4, we consider a variant of E. 
3 We do not mean “realistic in all respects” since we assume that logical omniscience 
holds in the cases in question. However, this idealization is harmless, for if the 
assumption of logical omniscience were dropped, then a thesis similar to SOT would 
hold. See Roche and Sober (2014, p. 195) for discussion. 
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Pr(Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50 | Joe got lung cancer after age 50) = β 
 
You then learn that Joe got lung cancer after age 50, so you increase your credence in 
Joe’s being a heavy smoker before age 50, from α to β. 
This is rather routine. But now suppose that after you have done all this, you learn 
that if Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50 and Joe got lung cancer after age 50, then 
the former would explain the latter. Should this new information lead you to change your 
credence in the proposition that Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50? For example, 
should it lead you to increase your credence in that proposition from β to some greater 
value?4 
The answer to both these questions, we submit, is negative. What you learned 
concerning what would explain what is evidentially irrelevant (in the Bayesian sense) to 
the proposition that Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50. Your credence in that 
proposition should remain at β. This is the idea behind SOT. 
We (2013, 2014) offer no theory of explanation. Does this vitiate our argument for 
SOT? We think not. Our focus is on causal explanation as in the example just considered. 
Our claim is that SOT is true on any reasonable understanding of causal explanation. If 
we are right, this would be a significant result, regardless of whether SOT holds when 
explanation is non-causal. 
Climenhaga (forthcoming) argues against SOT.5 He argues that SOT goes wrong 
when applied to a case like that of Joe. He also considers a variant of SOT, called 
“SOT*”, and argues that it too is mistaken. Climenhaga has causal explanation in mind 
but he, like us, offers no theory thereof. We explain his arguments in Section 2, critique 
them in Section 3, and conclude in Section 4. 
 
 
2 Climenhaga’s arguments 
 
Climenhaga’s arguments are framed in terms of a case that resembles the example just 
described about Joe. The probabilities he discusses concern the following propositions 
(where the labels “Ca” and “Sm” are ours): 
 
Ca: S gets cancer. 																																																								
4 We assume that explanatoriness can be informative to logically omniscient subjects. 
This should be uncontroversial. E is not a logical truth in the example about Joe. 
Note that in cases where E is a logical truth, SOT is trivially true. 
5 All references to Climenhaga are to Climenhaga (forthcoming). 
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Sm: S smokes. 
E: If Sm and Ca were true, then Sm would explain Ca. 
C1: Smoking sometimes causes cancer. 
C2: Cancer sometimes causes smoking. 
C3: Smoking and cancer sometimes have a common cause. 
 
C1, C2, and C3 are token-level, not type-level, causal claims. C1, for example, says that at 
least one token of smoking causes (in the past, present, or future) at least one token of 
cancer. 
 
2.1 Climenhaga’s argument against SOT 
 
Climenhaga points out that SOT entails that  
 
(6) Pr(Sm | Ca & E) = Pr(Sm | Ca) 
 
Here and below the numbers are his. For ease of expression, we modify notation and 
suppress reference to background information K. Climenhaga argues against SOT by 
arguing that (6) is false. His argument is based in part on the following claims: 
 
(16) Pr(Sm | Ca & E) = Pr(C1 | Ca & E)Pr(Sm | Ca & E & C1) + 
  Pr(~C1 | Ca & E)Pr(Sm | Ca & E & ~C1) 
 
(17) Pr(Sm | Ca) = Pr(C1 | Ca)Pr(Sm | Ca & C1) + 
  Pr(~C1 | Ca)Pr(Sm | Ca & ~C1) 
 
(18) Pr(C1 | Ca & E) > Pr(C1 | Ca) 
 
(19) Pr(Sm | Ca & E & C1) ≥ Pr(Sm | Ca & C1) 
 
(20) Pr(Sm | Ca & E & ~C1) = 0 
 
Climenhaga takes each of these claims to be true and argues that from them it follows 
that (6) is true only if 
 
(*) Pr(~C1 | Ca)Pr(Sm | Ca & ~C1) = Pr(C1 | Ca & E)Pr(Sm | Ca & E & C1) – 
      Pr(C1 | Ca)Pr(Sm | Ca & C1) 
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The label “(*)” is ours. Is (*) true? If the answer is negative, then, assuming that each of 
(16)-(20) is true, it follows that (6) is false, and so is SOT. 
Climenhaga addresses (*) in two paragraphs. The first is this: 
 
Nevertheless, for (6) to be true the second summand in (17) would need to exactly 
equal the difference between the first summand in (16) and the first summand in (17). 
While this could be the case, there is no reason to expect it a priori. Hence, far from 
being a general truth, if (6) is true in this case it is only by fortuitous coincidence. (p. 
10) 
 
It might seem odd that Climenhaga is discussing whether (*) is a priori and non-
coincidental. The issue, after all, is whether (*) is true. Climenhaga’s point, we take it, is 
that (*) is false in at least some of the cases in which SOT is meant to hold. 
Why, though, should this point be accepted? We noted above that Climenhaga 
addresses (*) in two paragraphs. The second, which immediately follows the first, is this 
(where some notation and formatting have been modified): 
 
More importantly, the negative influence of E on Sm sketched above is not the kind of 
influence that either proponents or opponents of inference to the best explanation 
have had in mind when disagreeing about whether explanation is relevant to 
confirmation. And if we build into K information that screens off this influence, then 
… [(6) is false]. For example, imagine that we know that nothing besides smoking 
will give S cancer (and that S will not get cancer for no reason). In this case Pr(~C1 | 
Ca) = 0 − if the only way for S to get cancer is from smoking, then if S gets cancer it 
is because of S’s smoking, and so C1 is true. Hence the second summand in both (16) 
and (17) is 0, and the dominance of (16)’s first summand over (17)’s first summand is 
sufficient for it to be the case that … Pr(Sm | Ca & E) > Pr(Sm | Ca). (p. 10) 
 
That completes Climenhaga’s argument against SOT. 
 
2.2  Climenhaga’s argument against SOT* 
 
The thesis that Climenhaga calls SOT* is this:6 
 																																																								
6 Climenhaga’s official formulation of SOT* (p. 5) involves the expression “for all K” 
where K is the background information. We take this to be a slip, for SOT* thus 
formulated is trivially false. 
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Pr(Sm | Ca & C1) = Pr(Sm | Ca) 
 
Climenhaga argues against SOT* by arguing for 
 
(14) Pr(Sm | Ca & C1) > Pr(Sm | Ca) 
 
and his argument for (14) is based in part on the following claims: 
 
(4) Pr(Ca | Sm) > Pr(Ca) 
 
(7) Pr(Ca | Sm & ~[C1 ∨ C2 ∨ C3]) = Pr(Ca | ~[C1 ∨ C2 ∨ C3]) 
 
(9) Pr(Sm | ~[C1 ∨ C2 ∨ C3]) = Pr(Sm) 
 
Climenhaga takes these claims to show that 
 
(13) Pr(Sm | Ca & [C1 ∨ C2 ∨ C3]) > Pr(Sm | Ca) 
 
Since C1 is stronger than C1 ∨ C2 ∨ C3, it might seem that (13) entails: 
 
(14) Pr(Sm | Ca & C1) > Pr(Sm | Ca) 
 
However, confirmation is not monotonic, so caution is needed in moving from (13) to 
(14). Here, in its entirety, is what Climenhaga says about this last step (where some 
notation and formatting have been modified): 
 
Presumably any one of C1, C2, and C3 also licenses extrapolation from our frequency 
data. Consequently, we can replace C1 ∨ C2 ∨ C3 with any one of C1, C2, and C3, and 
… (13) will remain true. In particular, it will be true that … Pr(Sm | Ca & C1) > 
Pr(Sm | Ca). (p. 8) 
 
That completes Climenhaga’s argument against SOT*. 
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3 Our critiques 
 
3.1 Our critique of Climenhaga’s argument against SOT 
 
Realizing that claims (16)-(20) aren’t enough to refute SOT, Climenhaga assumes, 
additionally, that “nothing besides smoking will give S cancer (and that S will not get 
cancer for no reason)”. Let’s call this assumption “SOW” (= “Smoking is the Only 
Way”). Climenhaga is right that it follows from SOW that Pr(~C1 | Ca) = 0, but there are 
flies in the ointment. First, SOW contradicts (18) by making both Pr(C1 | Ca & E) and 
Pr(C1 | Ca) equal 1. Second, SOW entails (6) by making both Pr(Sm | Ca & E) and Pr(Sm 
| Ca) equal 1. Climenhaga’s several assumptions are not mutually consistent, but there is 
more: SOW, far from being a problem for (6), entails it. So SOW is not a problem for 
SOT.7 
Suppose, now, that (16)-(20) are all true in at least some of the cases in which SOT is 
meant to hold. Is it plausible that (*) is true in all such cases? To answer this question, 
let’s return to the case of Joe. Recall that you start with two sample frequencies (with 
values 0.3 and 0.7), which you use to estimate Joe’s probabilities: 
 
Pr(Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50) = α 
 
Pr(Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50 | Joe got lung cancer after age 50) = β 
 
Why are you able to do this? Not because Joe is a member of your sample; he is not. But 
then, why? 
The reason why has two parts. First, your sample frequency information (perhaps 
when supplemented with assumptions that do not say whether smoking and cancer are 
causally or explanatorily connected) enables you to estimate frequencies in the 
population from which the sample was drawn.8 In particular, it enables you to arrive at 
the following estimates (where “P” means population): 
 
FreqP(people who were heavy smokers before age 50) = α 																																																								
7 The same is true of any alternative assumption on which Pr(~C1 | Ca) equals 0 and Ca 
entails Sm. 
8 It is controversial how estimation problems should be solved. Broadly speaking, there 
are Bayesian and frequentist approaches. See Howson and Urbach (1993) for a Bayesian 
perspective and Romeijn (2016) for discussion of maximum likelihood estimation. For 
discussion of statistical decision theory, see Vassend, Sober, and Fitelson (forthcoming). 
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FreqP(people who were heavy smokers before age 50 | people who got lung cancer 
after age 50) = β 
 
Second, since from your perspective, Joe is a random member of the population, you 
align your probabilities for Joe with your estimated population frequencies. 
Now why should your credence in the proposition that Joe was a heavy smoker before 
age 50 remain at β upon learning that E (= if Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50 and 
got lung cancer after age 50, then the former would explain the latter)? The reason, in 
part, is that what you learn should have no impact on your estimated population 
frequencies. 
We say “in part” for a reason. Suppose that E should have no impact on your 
estimated population frequencies. However, suppose, further, that your background 
information includes the proposition that ~E ∨ Joe is a member of P*, where P* is a sub-
population of people who got lung cancer after age 50, and where your estimated 
frequency of people in P* who were heavy smokers before age 50 is greater than β. Then 
your credence in the proposition that Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50 should 
increase to a value greater than β upon learning E. This means that part of what is doing 
the work in the initial version of the case (not the version in this paragraph) is the fact 
that your background information doesn’t include propositions like the disjunctive 
proposition that ~E ∨ Joe is a member of P*. This illustrates how background 
assumptions can be cooked up to render E evidentially relevant. 
There is still the question of whether it’s plausible that (*) holds in all of the cases at 
issue. Our answer is yes, because, in part, it’s plausible that in all such cases E should 
have no impact on your estimated population frequency of people who smoke among 
people who get cancer. 
These points generalize beyond Joe’s smoking and cancer. There is a wide range of 
realistic cases involving sample frequency information in which E − the proposition that 
H would explain O if H and O were true − should have no impact on your estimated 
population frequencies and, in part because of this, should have no impact on your 
credence in H. 
 
3.2 Our critique of Climenhaga’s argument against SOT* 
 
The situation with respect to Climenhaga’s argument against SOT* is similar. SOT*, 
recall, says that Pr(Sm | Ca & C1) = Pr(Sm | Ca). There is a wide range of realistic cases 
involving sample frequency information in which C1 should have no impact on your 
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estimate of the population frequency of people who smoke among people who get cancer 
and, in part because of this, should have no impact on your credence in Sm.9 
Where, then, does Climenhaga’s argument against SOT* go wrong? Climenhaga 
claims that the argument for (13) carries over to (14). However, consider Climenhaga’s 
defense of (7) (where the expression “there is no explanatory connection between 
smoking and cancer” simply means that ~[C1 ∨ C2 ∨ C3]): 
 
This [viz., (7)] is because on the (extremely unlikely) hypothesis that there is no 
explanatory connection between smoking and cancer, the observed frequency data is 
a huge fluke. But we shouldn’t expect huge flukes to continue. If the observed 
association of smoking and cancer is merely coincidental, then we should expect 
future smokers that we observe to have cancer at the same rate as the rest of the 
population. (p. 6)  
 
If the argument for (13) carried over to (14), then Climenhaga’s defense of (7) would 
carry over to the following: 
 
(7*) Pr(Ca | Sm & ~C1) = Pr(Ca | ~C1) 
 
However, Climenhaga’s defense of (7) does not carry over to (7*). The supposition that 
smoking never causes cancer leaves it open that they oftentimes have a common cause 
and thus leaves it open that it is not “coincidental” or a “fluke” that your sample 
frequency of people who smoke among people who get lung cancer is greater than your 
sample frequency of people who smoke. 
There is more. Neither (7) nor (13) strikes us as compelling. And, as we aim to show 
below, Climenhaga’s argument for (7), and thus his argument for (13), fails. 
First, it is not true in general that: 
 
(**) If there is no explanatory connection between F and G, and if FreqS(G | F) > 
FreqS(G), then the frequency inequality is a fluke, and it therefore shouldn’t 
be expected to continue to hold in the future. 
 
(**) is doubly mistaken. To see why consider a made-up case described by Sober 																																																								
9 Climenhaga notes in effect (footnote 9) that it is not true in general that Pr(Sm | Ca) 
equals the sample frequency of people who smoke among people who get cancer. We are 
not claiming otherwise. Our claim, rather, is that Pr(Sm | Ca) equals your estimate of the 
population frequency of people who smoke among people who get cancer. 
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(2001).10 Let F be the class of days in the past 200 years on which British bread prices 
have been above average, G be the class of days on which Venetian sea levels have been 
above average, and suppose that both British bread prices and Venetian sea levels have 
increased monotonically during those two centuries. Then, though there is no explanatory 
connection between F and G, for a randomly selected day d in those 200 years, FreqS(d is 
in G | d is in F) > FreqS(d is in G) and the association is no fluke; new samples drawn 
from those 200 years will reliably exhibit the same pattern. The pattern is no accident, but 
this doesn’t mean that it must persist forever. Second, even if it is required that flukes not 
continue forever, the example can be modified; suppose there is reason to expect that 
Venetian sea levels and British bread prices each continue to increase beyond those 200 
years, each going up for its own endogenous reasons.11 
Climenhaga acknowledges in effect that (**) is not always true; indeed, he thinks that 
the case of British bread prices and Venetian sea levels shows this. He finds it plausible, 
though, that there are no counterexamples to (**) if the background information includes 
all relevant temporal information. We disagree. Some counterexamples to (**) are spatial 
(see Sober 2008, p. 233). 
Climenhaga additionally argues that Sober (2001) should accept (**) as applied to the 
smoking-and-cancer case. He writes: 
  
… Sober (2001: 342-43) agrees that separate cause explanations “often” do not 
predict correlations, and I think he should accept that (7) is such a case. According to 
Sober, inference to a common cause is often rational because it is frequently the case 
that a common cause explanation predicts a correlation where a separate cause 
explanation does not. … However, it is clearly rational to infer a causal relationship 
between smoking and cancer from the frequency data in K. Hence, Sober’s reasoning 
would suggest that (7) is a case in which the above principle is true. (pp. 6-7; italics 
are ours) 
 
It is not true, though, that Sober endorses the italicized statement. Sober is concerned 
with “favoring” (where favoring is understood in terms of the law of likelihood). His 
point is that often an observed association O favors a common-cause hypothesis CC over 
a separate-cause hypothesis SC in the sense that Pr(O | CC) > Pr(O | SC). It does not 
																																																								
10 Sober uses this example against Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause. For 
discussion and references, see, in addition to Sober (2001), Sober (2008, 2015). 
11 The assumption of monotonicity is inessential. See Sober (2001, Sec. 3). For a gaggle 
of real-world counterexamples to (**), see Vigen (2015). 
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follow, in the cases in question, that Pr(CC | O) > Pr(SC | O).12 Moreover, Sober’s point, 
even when conjoined with the claim that it’s rational to infer a causal relationship 
between smoking and cancer, leaves it open that (7) is false because the left side of (7) is 
greater than the right.   
One final point about SOT* is in order. SOT* is logically independent of SOT. So 
even if, contra what we have been arguing, the argument against SOT* succeeded, it 
would not follow that the same is true of the argument against SOT. 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Our primary point in all this is that explanatoriness (in the subjunctive sense according to 
which H would explain O if H and O were true) is evidentially irrelevant (in the Bayesian 
sense according to which evidential irrelevance is a matter of probabilistic irrelevance) in 
at least a wide range of realistic cases involving sample frequency information. Here, 
then, is a clear sense in which explanatoriness is not a guide to confirmation. 
The reader may wonder whether the case for SOT requires that probabilities be 
inferred from sample frequencies. It is easy to see how the same result can obtain when 
probabilities are dictated by a well-established theory. We tell you that Jack and Jill are 
either full siblings or father and daughter. Mendelian genetics tells you that, either way,  
 
Pr(Jill has one copy of rare gene G | Jack has one copy of rare gene G) = 0.5 
 
We then tell you something new, that if Jack and Jill both have gene G, then Jack’s 
having the gene would explain why Jill has it. If, as we can suppose, explanation here 
means causal explanation, it follows that you then know that if Jack and Jill both have 
gene G, then Jack is Jill’s father, not her brother. This should change the probability you 
assign to Jill’s having gene G not one bit. 
We have a secondary point. Recall that if your background information includes the 
proposition that ~E ∨ Joe is a member of P*, where P* is a sub-population of people who 
got lung cancer after age 50, and your estimated frequency of people who were heavy 
smokers before age 50 among members of P* is greater than β, then your credence in the 
proposition that Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50 should increase to a value greater 
than β upon learning E. Our secondary point is that there is nothing special about 
explanatoriness: it is like any other contingent proposition in that whether it is 																																																								
12 It might seem that Sober (2001, p. 343) believes otherwise. But there he has in mind 
cases where Pr(CC) ≥ Pr(SC). 
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evidentially relevant hinges on background information. If explanatoriness is evidentially 
relevant in a given case, then this is not because explanatoriness is evidentially relevant 
in itself. 
There is no explicit mention in E or SOT of alternatives to H, but E in SOT can be 
replaced by a claim about explanatoriness that is comparative: 
 
C: H would explain O if H and O were true, where H is better than the alternatives as 
a potential explanation of E. 
 
If the story about Joe were suitably reformulated, then the point would be that when you 
learn that Joe’s being a heavy smoker before age 50 would explain his getting lung 
cancer after age 50 where this explanation is better than the alternatives, your credence in 
the proposition that Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50 should remain at β. We thus 
arrive at the following: 
 
Comparative Screening-Off Thesis (CSOT): Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, 
and C the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true, where H is better 
than the alternatives as a potential explanation of E. Then Pr(H | O & C) = Pr(H | O). 
 
CSOT bears on the theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation” (IBE), 
which can be formalized as follows (see Lycan 2002 and Psillos 2007 for similar 
formulations): 
 
O. 
H would explain O if H and O were true. 
H is better than the alternatives as a potential explanation of E. 
Thus, in all probability, H. 
 
IBE-ists, we take it, hold that the second and third premises here are essential in that 
without them the conclusion would not follow. That is, IBE-ists hold that the probability 
of H given all three premises is high whereas the probability of H given just the first 
premise is not. If IBE is meant to apply to cases of causal explanation in which 
probabilities are estimated from sample frequencies, it follows that CSOT conflicts with 
IBE.13 The key point is that if CSOT is true, then there is a wide range of realistic cases 																																																								
13 The same is true with respect to CSOT and a theory defended by Douven and 
Wenmackers (forthcoming, p. 5) according to which, roughly, if you learn O, and also 
learn that H is the best explanation (in a partition of hypotheses) of O, then H gets a 
 13 
involving frequency data in which the kind of explanatoriness at issue in IBE is 
evidentially irrelevant.14 
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